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Abstract
This article offers an explanation of why firms’ downsizing pat-
terns may vary substantially in magnitude and timing, taking the
form of one-time massive cuts, waves of layoffs, or zero layoff policies.
The key element of this theory is that workers’ expectations about
their job security affect their on-the-job performance. In a situation
where firms face adverse shocks, the productivity effect of job insecu-
rity forces firms to balance laying off redundant workers and maintain-
ing survivors’ commitment. The cost of ensuring commitment differs
between firms with different characteristics and determines whether
workers are laid off all at once or in stages. However, if firms have
private information about their future profits, they may not lay off
any workers in order to signal a bright future, boosting workers’ con-
fidence.
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1 Introduction
In 2002, companies in the United States announced layoffs of 1.96 million
workers, with firms such as American Express, Lucent, Hewlett-Packard, and
Dell Computer conducting multiple rounds in the same year.1 The tragedy
of 9/11 had reverberated throughout the economy, leaving businesses scram-
bling to adjust. Workers had to face the consequences and those consequences
were grim - Farber (2003) estimates that for displaced workers the average
decline in weekly earnings was 10.6 percent and the re-employment probabil-
ity for a male college graduate was 88.5% percent.2 Despite the potentially
large impact on welfare, there is no clear picture about how downsizing is
conducted. In this paper, we investigate factors that affect both the amount
and timing of downsizing.
We present a simple model of firms’ downsizing decisions when they face
adverse shocks. Firms must take into account that uncertainty about the
possibility of being laid off tomorrow affects workers’ performance today.
This creates a link between current and future employment decisions of the
firm and implies that the firm will not automatically adjust its workforce
to coincide with the current shock. Instead, the firm will try to strike a
balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining the survivors’
commitment to their work. This framework permits us to clearly identify
conditions which lead to waves of downsizing, one-time massive cuts, and
zero-layoff policies.
We formalize the notion that the timing of downsizing can vary substan-
tially. It is quite common to hear about massive layoffs and/or waves of
downsizing. On average, two-thirds of firms that lay off employees in a given
year do so again the following year.3 Specifically, we call a one time sweeping
1See Cascio (2002) for details.
2The re-employment probability uses Farber’s linear probability model estimates (Table
1, Farber (2003)) for a male college graduate in 2001 whose age is between 35 and 44, has
4-10 years of tenure on the job, and for whom it has been 3 years since he was displaced.
The earnings number is for workers in 2001 who suffered a displacement between 1999 and
2001. The consequences may be even more severe: Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993)
estimate that high tenure workers who had been displaced suffered a loss of 25 percent
of their predisplacement earnngs even five years after having separated from their former
firms.
3Taken from U.S. Department of Labor. Moreover, although one may think that down-
sizing is ‘lumpy’ due to factory and office closings, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996,
p.17) find that among manufacturing firms, only “23% of job destruction takes place at
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cut in the workforce a “big-bang” and waves of cuts “gradualism” and pro-
vide an explanation based on job insecurity for why either may be chosen.4
Baron and Kreps (2000), in their textbook on human resources, discuss the
basic costs and benefits of the approaches and state, “by moving boldly and
rapidly, companies may minimize the long-term psychological damage” while
“a one-time massacre runs the risk of cutting too much”. Within the model
we are able to be very precise about what factors determine which policy
is used. We find that a big-bang benefits the firm by increasing survivors’
commitment to their work (through the elimination of job insecurity) while
imposing a cost on the firm of excessive layoffs. The big-bang is more likely
when (i) workers’ outside job prospects are better and (ii) the firm’s marginal
profitability is lower due to either technology or demand shocks.
More downsizing is not always the solution to controlling job insecurity.
In fact, when firms have private information about their profitability, we find
that reducing layoffs (even to the point of zero layoffs) diminishes job insecu-
rity by allowing firms to signal that their future is bright. Examples of zero
layoff employment practices abound. In the aftermath of the 9/11 disaster,
airlines reduced their staff by 20% on average in response to dramatically
reduced business. Southwest Airlines, on the other hand, did not lay off or
furlough anyone.5 And despite strong downturns in the financial markets,
financial firms Lehman Brothers and Edward Jones insisted on keeping their
staff intact.6
The model has two periods. Firms face an unexpected negative shock
(which is observed simultaneously by a firm and its workers) in period one.
In period two, the profitability of a firm can either rebound or face a further
negative shock; this information is known to the firm ex-ante but may or may
not be known to workers. This second shock may reflect fluctuations specific
plants that shut down”.
4Dewatripont and Roland (1992a, 1992b, 1995) were the first to study gradualism
versus big-bang strategies in the context of reforms in transition economies, focusing on
private information and learning.
5Cascio (2002), p. 87.
6From Fortune (January 22, 2002, www.fortune.com) and BusinessWeek (January 14,
2002, p.57), respectively. In fact, informal zero layoff policies are not infrequent (47 of the
100 companies that made Fortune’s 2002 list of the “100 Best Companies to work for”
have them, Fortune (January 22, 2002, www.fortune.com)). While firms may use zero
layoff policies as ex ante implicit commitments (for example, see Kanemoto and MacLeod,
1989), in this paper we use the term “zero layoff policies” to characterize the situation in
which firms retain all workers despite an unexpected negative shock.
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to the firm and/or the firm’s preparation or sensitivity to downturns. We
model perceived job insecurity as a worker’s expected probability of being let
go in the future. Increased job insecurity can reduce workers’ commitment to
their work and make them more likely to look for other positions. Incentives
for working are provided through the wage - higher job insecurity implies
higher wages must be paid, forming the basis for our results.
A fundamental assumption of the paper is that job insecurity demoti-
vates workers. Demotivation as a consequence of downsizing is well known
among managers. In Bewley’s 1999 survey, 41% of businesses responded
that layoffs hurt the morale of survivors for a long time. Greenhalgh (1982)
discusses the negative impacts of job insecurity, and proposes that “deci-
sions regarding change must optimize job security to minimize dysfunctional
worker response”.7 Moreover, workers are very aware of the uncertainty that
faces them. Schmidt (1999), looking at the General Social Survey, finds that
workers’ beliefs about the probability of job loss track the unemployment
rate and aggregate downsizing patterns quite well.
The issues we analyze are related to two strands of the labor market
contracting literature. The relational contracting literature (Bull (1987),
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), and
Levin (2003)) models a firm’s reputation in the labor market as a zero-one
variable in an infinitely repeated game, making the framework difficult to
adapt for the analysis of how a firm should design its downsizing policy when
faced with unexpected shocks. The implicit contract literature (Azariadis
(1975), Bailey (1974), and Gordon (1974)) assumes the commitment of a
firm to wages contingent on anticipated shocks as well as risk aversion.
Moral hazard forms the basis of our analysis. The main effect that drives
our results, that workers must be compensated for job insecurity, also ap-
pears in efficiency wage models that extend Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to
product market fluctuations - namely Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) and Saint-
Paul (1996). Lastly, Jeon and Laffont (1999 and 2006) study downsizing in
the public sector as a static mechanism design problem where workers have
private information about their ability.
In section 2, we define the model. In section 3 we analyze the game under
complete information. Section 4 examines the asymmetric information game.
In section 5 we conclude.
7Greenhalgh (1982), p.156. Brockner (1988) provides a review of the management
literature on job insecurity, finding somewhat mixed results.
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2 Environment
2.1 Workers
There is a mass 1 of homogeneous workers and two periods. We consider a
very simple model of moral hazard. An employed worker has two possible
choices of unobservable effort, high (e = 1) or low (e = α) with 0 < α < 1.
There are two possible outputs, a high one equal to yh and a low one equal
to 0, where the probability of producing the output of yh is equal to e. We
model two different benefits of shirking (e = α) that a worker may gain
utility from. First, as usual, his disutility of working increases with the level
of effort. More precisely, let the disutility of effort associated with e be given
by e2. Second, shirking gives the worker more time to search for other jobs.8
Specifically, conditional on being laid off at the end of period 1, a worker who
exerted effort e in period 1 has probability (1− γEe)a (with γE ∈ (0, 1)) of
finding a job in period 2, where a represents labor market tightness in period
2.9
To formalize the idea of job insecurity, let pi be the expected probability
of a worker employed by a type i firm (firm types will be defined in section
2.2) in period 1 remaining employed at the same firm in period 2. Given
the total number ni1 of workers employed by a type i firm in period 1, we
define pi=min
{
Eni
2
ni
1
, 1
}
where Eni2 is the expectation of workers in period 1
about firm i’s employment level in period 2. We assume for now that the firm
cannot commit to long-term contracts.10 Let w¯i1 and w
i
1 be firm i’s wages
11
8There is a large literature about on-the-job search. A survey can be found in Pissarides
(2000).
9Hence a is a function that is decreasing in the number of unemployed workers u, is
increasing in the number of vacancies v, and is between 0 and 1. We fix a as exogenous. In
Jeon and Shapiro (2006), we allow for it to be endogenous and find that multiple equilibria
may exist depending on how large the matching frictions are.
10In Jeon and Shapiro (2006), we analyze the case of long term contracts. Such contracts
increase employment for some parameters (and maintain it for the rest of the parameter
space) for the bad firm. Long-term contracts make workers cheaper by allowing firms
greater control over job insecurity. Nevertheless, the patterns of massive cuts and layoff
waves still remain.
11We allow the firm to use two kinds of wages. If it could use only a single wage as in a
standard efficiency wage model, it would not be able to induce effort in any finite period
model with short-term contracts: all workers would shirk in the last period for any given
wage, inducing the firm to choose the minimum wage for that period, which in turn would
make all workers shirk for the next to last period, etc. As long as the firm can use two
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associated with high and low output respectively in period 1. We assume
that workers are protected by limited liability such that the wages must be
larger than wm; for example, wm could represent a minimum wage, utility
from self-employment, or unemployment benefits.
A worker employed by firm i in period 1 thus has the following utility
depending on his choice of effort:
U1(e) = ew¯
i
1 + (1− e)w
i
1 − e
2 + δ[piV E,in2 + (1− p
i)(1− γEe)aV
E,out
2 +
(1− pi)(1− (1− γEe)a)V
U
2 ]
where V s2 is the expected value in period 2 of remaining employed within
the firm (superscript s=“E,in”), working at a different firm (superscript
s=“E,out”), and being unemployed (superscript s=“U”) and δ is the dis-
count rate common to firms and workers.
Assuming the firm wants to implement high effort12, the incentive con-
straint takes the form of U1(1) ≥ U1(α), which reduces to:
(ICi1) w¯
i
1 − w
i
1 ≥ 1 + α+ δ(1− p
i)γEa(V
E,out
2 − V
U
2 )
Since all that matters for giving incentives is the difference between the
wages, and since wages are costly for the firm, this implies that the firm will
set wi1 as low as possible (i.e. w
i
1 = wm). Hence, we have:
w¯i1 = wm + 1 + α+ δmax
{
1−
Eni2
ni1
, 0
}
γEa(V
E,out
2 − V
U
2 ) ≡ w
i(ni1) (1)
wages, adding a third instrument of firing a worker for low output does not affect our result
qualitatively since the main idea that more job security (higher pit) reduces the amount
needed to compensate the worker still holds; hence adding conditional firing complicates
the analysis without changing the intuition. As mentioned in the introduction, this effect
also can be found in pure shirking stories (without on-the-job search) à la Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) don’t allow for discontinuity in pit (they have no
min operator), while Saint Paul (1996) does. Saint Paul, however, assumes that firms can
commit today to employment and wage levels tomorrow (tomorrow’s shocks are known),
which is what provides workers employed today with incentives for effort. This makes his
focus substantially different than ours: we allow firms to react immediately to shocks, and
allow these shocks to be unexpected. We also look at the tradeoff between downsizing
today versus downsizing tomorrow in this context.
12A sufficient condition for any firm to want to implement high effort for all of their
workers is f1(n
oG
2 , θ1) >
1+α
1−α
, where the notation is defined in sections 2.2 and 3.1. A
proof of sufficiency is available from the authors upon request.
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It is reasonable to assume that V E,out2 > V
U
2 . The optimal wage thus
takes into account both the possibility of job loss and expected returns to
job search. More job insecurity or better outside offers make the worker less
attached to her current job. A higher wage must then be paid to maintain
worker effort.
Plugging in the optimal wage, the utility conditional on being employed
in firm i at time 1 (given pi) is given by:
U1(1) ≡ wm + α+ δ
{
piV E,in2 + (1− p
i)aV E,out2 + (1− p
i)(1− a)V U2
}
In period 2, the contracting environment remains the same, but with
the exception that there is no continuation game. Job search and future
employment becomes irrelevant and w¯i2 = wm+1+α. Consequently, V
E,in
2 =
wm + α. Since the second period is the last period for all firms, it must be
that V E,out2 = wm + α as well.
Lastly, we assume that if a worker is unemployed for a period, she receives
wm and her probability of finding a job in the next period is (1− γU)a, with
γU ∈ (0, 1). Then the utility of an unemployed person in period 1 is equal to
V U1 ≡ wm+δ[(1−γU)aV
E,out
2 +(1−a(1−γU))V
U
2 ]. Therefore, the participation
constraint is satisfied if the following holds:
(PCi1) U1(1) ≥ V
U
1
The participation constraint strictly holds13 for any pi. Hence, employed
workers earn rents from moral hazard. In a potentially richer model, the par-
ticipation constraint may bind; in this case, the job insecurity effect would
still be present, but the firm’s wages would rise, further reducing employ-
ment.14
2.2 The Firm
We focus on one firm in an industry. The firm has two possible sources
of labor supply, its workers from the previous period (whom we will call
original workers) and workers from the general labor market (whom we will
13Given that V E,in2 = V
E,out
2 , which we previously argued is true.
14These effects would be exacerbated if we included labor market competition. In the
current formulation we implicitly assume that upon rejecting an offer, workers become
unemployed for the period.
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call new workers). We assume that original workers are more productive
for the firm than new workers, i.e. there exists firm-specific human capital.
Original workers thus produce yoh = 1 and new workers produce y
n
h = φ with
0 < φ < 1. Define the total output of the workers to be N it = n
oi
t + φn
ni
t ,
where t = 1, 2. In our formulation, wages are not connected to yh; hence the
firm strictly prefers re-hiring original workers to replacing them with new
workers.15
In period one, the industry has an adverse shock and the firm has the
profit function gross of the wage payment f(N i1, θ1), where θ1 is a parameter
which represents the shock that is common to the industry. Therefore the
firm will downsize its labor force in period one (we will formalize this in
section 3.2). In addition, in period one, the firm discovers how well it is
prepared to deal with the unexpected shock. More precisely, the firm is
either well prepared and has the profit function f(NG2 , θ
G
2 ) in period 2 or is
poorly prepared and has the profit function f(NB2 , θ
B
2 ) in period 2. We call
the firm with θ2 = θ
G
2 the good type and the firm with θ2 = θ
B
2 the bad type.
Formally, the index i ∈ {G,B} denotes the firm’s type.16
We make the following assumptions about the profit function of the firm:
Assumption 1:
f(N, θG2 ) > f(N, θ1) > f(N, θ
B
2 )
f1(N, θ
G
2 ) > f1(N, θ1) > f1(N, θ
B
2 ),
f11(N, θ) < 0 for all θ ∈
{
θ1, θ
G
2 , θ
B
2
}
.
This implies that the good (bad) firm has higher (lower) profits and
marginal profits, conditional on having the same output, in period two than
in period one. Lastly, profits are concave in output. Shocks are defined here
as affecting the profit function - hence a shock could be related to either
15Making wages conditional on productivity wouldn’t change results as long as a firm
still strictly prefers original workers to new workers. For example, suppose original workers
and new workers had different outside options, wom and w
n
m respectively. Wages paid would
then be heterogeneous. A sufficient condition for a firm to prefer original workers (and
obtain the results in the paper) is wom + 1 + α <
wn
m
+1+α
φ
.
16In Jeon and Shapiro (2006), we extend the model to allow second period shocks to be
stochastic (with type redefined as the probability a good shock will occur) and find that
our results are robust.
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the demand side or the cost side. An example of a function that satisfies
Assumption 1 is θf(N), where θG2 > θ1 > θ
B
2 .
2.3 Timing
There are two periods. The timing within a period t (t = 1, 2) is given by:
1. A shock θt hits the firm and is observed by both the firm and its workers.
2. The firm decides the number of original workers to retain and their
wage.
3. Original workers decide whether to accept or reject the firm’s offer.
4. The firm decides the number of new workers to hire and their wage.
5. New workers decide whether to accept or reject the firm’s offer.
6. Workers exert effort, production occurs, profits are realized, and pay-
ments are made.
There are two things to remark about the timing. First of all, the pa-
rameter θ2 is known by the firm in period one. In our complete information
analysis, the workers will know in period one what type of shock the firm
faces in period 2, while in the asymmetric information analysis the workers
will be uncertain about which shock will hit the firm. Secondly, in the first
period, by assumption, the firm is downsizing. Consequently there will be
no hiring of new workers in period 1.
3 Complete Information
We begin the analysis by working backwards and looking first at period
two. The second period analysis will be the same under both complete and
asymmetric information, since there is no job insecurity problem.
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3.1 The Second Period
Since the second period is the last period and there is no continuation payoff
for workers, the wage for both types of firm is equal to w2 = wm + 1 + α.
Firm i’s maximization problem in period two is defined as:
max
noi
2
,nni
2
f(noi2 + φn
ni
2 , θ
i
2)− w2n
oi
2 − w2n
ni
2
s.t. noi2 ≤ n
i
1, n
ni
2 ≥ 0
From the first order conditions and using the facts that the marginal
product of labor is positive and φ < 1, it is clear that at least one of the
constraints binds. The solution depends on how many original workers are
left from the previous period. When there are a large number of original
workers (ni1 large), the firm lays off original workers and does not hire any
new workers. The optimal number of original workers to retain in this case
is given by n¯oi2 , where:
f1(n¯
oi
2 , θ
i
2) = w2 (2)
Therefore, for any ni1 > n¯
oi
2 , n
oi
2 = n¯
oi
2 and profits are independent of n
i
1.
For ni1 < n¯
oi
2 , all original workers are kept (n
oi
2 = n
i
1). The firm decides to
hire new workers if the number of original workers is very small. We define
n∗ni2 as the number of new workers hired and N˜
i
2 as the total effective labor
output from new and original workers, which both follow from the equation:
f1(N˜
i
2, θ
i
2) =
w2
φ
(3)
The number of new workers hired is n∗ni2 =
N˜i
2
−ni
1
φ
, and new workers are
hired only when ni1 < N˜
i
2.
Lastly, for the range N˜ i2 < n
i
1 < n¯
oi
2 , no new workers are hired and all the
original workers are retained. To summarize, we define the profits in period
two as:
πi2(n
i
1) = f(N˜
i
2, θ
i
2)− w2
N˜ i
2
−(1−φ)ni
1
φ
if ni1 ≤ N˜
i
2
f(ni1, θ
i
2)− w2n
i
1 if N˜
i
2 < n
i
1 ≤ n¯
oi
2
f(n¯oi2 , θ
i
2)− w2n¯
oi
2 if n
i
1 > n¯
oi
2
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3.2 The First Period
Suppose that the firm’s type is common knowledge in period one. Workers
are concerned about their probability of being retained in period 2. From the
previous section, we saw that all original workers are retained when ni1 < n¯
oi
2 ,
so pi=min
{
n¯oi
2
ni
1
, 1
}
. We assume that both types of firms are downsizing in
period one (the condition n¯oG2 < 1 is sufficient to guarantee this).
Firm i’s maximization problem17 in period one is defined as:
max
ni
1
f(ni1, θ1)− w
i(ni1)n
i
1 + δπ
i
2(n
i
1)
The first order condition sets marginal profitability f1(n
i
1, θ1) equal to the
marginal cost of retaining an additional original worker MCi(ni1):
MCi(ni1) = (wm + 1 + α) (1− δ
1−φ
φ
) if ni1 ≤ N˜
i
2
(wm + 1 + α) (1 + δ)− δf1(n
i
1, θ
i
2) if N˜
i
2 < n
i
1 ≤ n¯
oi
2
(wm + 1 + α) + δγEαa if n
i
1 > n¯
oi
2
(4)
The marginal cost factors in the period one wage cost and the effect that
retaining one more worker has on period two profits. Firstly, if the firm
retains a small number of workers in period 1 (ni1 ≤ N˜
i
2), retaining an extra
worker decreases its marginal cost because the extra worker will be retained
in period 2 and replace a less productive new worker. Secondly, if the firm
retains a medium number of workers in period 1 (N˜ i2 < n
i
1 ≤ n¯
oi
2 ), the extra
worker will be retained in period two but won’t replace a new worker. Lastly,
if the firm retains too many workers in period 1 (ni1 > n¯
oi
2 ), it will have to lay
off some in period 2 and must therefore pay more in period 1 to compensate
for the job insecurity that is created.
Let n∗i1 denote the solution, which is unique. Furthermore, let n
∗
1 de-
note the optimal static level of employment. This is the optimal level of
employment in t=1 when δ = 0 and is defined by:
f1(n
∗
1, θ1) = wm + 1 + α.
We are now ready to describe the equilibrium employment levels.
17Note that we can simplify wi(ni
1
) (previously defined in equation 1) notationally, since
it is reasonable to assume that all firms in the industry offer the same wage in period 2;
hence V E,out
2
− V
U
2
= α.
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Proposition 1 With complete information about θ2 and assumption 1,
1. The good type chooses n∗G1 ∈ (n
∗
1, n¯
oG
2 ] in period 1. In period 2, it
doesn’t fire anyone and hires either zero or a positive number of new workers.
2. The bad type either chooses a big-bang strategy
(
n∗B1 = n¯
oB
2
)
or a grad-
ual downsizing strategy
(
n∗B1 ∈
(
n¯oB2 , n
∗
1
))
. In the first case, there is no fur-
ther downsizing in period 2 while in the second case, downsizing occurs in
both periods and n∗B1 − n¯
oB
2 workers are laid off in period two.
The proof is in the appendix.
The actions of the good firm are very intuitive: since demand rebounds
in period two, a good type firm retains more original workers than the static
optimal level in period one and has no reason to fire any of them in period
two. It may in fact hire new workers in period two.
Job insecurity concerns induce the bad firm to retain less than the static
optimum18 (n∗B1 < n
∗
1) and create two types of equilibria (conditional on the
parameters), one where n∗B1 = n¯
oB
2 and one where n
∗B
1 > n¯
oB
2 . In the first
case, the bad firm, which faces adverse shocks in both period one and period
two, lays off workers only once - in period one. In period two the firm makes
no further labor force adjustments. We call this strategy “big-bang”, since
the firm drops the axe on its employees in one blow. When the firm lays off
workers in both periods (i.e. when n∗B1 > n¯
oB
2 ), we say that the firm resorts
to a policy of “gradualism”, where the firm adjusts its labor supply every
time there is an adverse shock.
In Figure 1, we depict the downsizing behavior of both types of firm.
The dashed line represents the marginal cost for the good firm of retaining
an additional worker in period 1 (summarized in equation 4). The dotted
line represents the marginal cost for the bad firm. We have superimposed
two examples of first period marginal productivity curves (f∗1 and f
∗∗
1 ). Note
that a first period marginal productivity curve is the same for both types
of firm since they face the same shock. The firm chooses a retention level
where its marginal productivity intersects its marginal cost. Given marginal
productivity f∗1 , the good firm chooses a level in period two where it will
retain everyone and hire new workers (point G1) and the bad firm chooses a
big-bang solution where it lays off everyone at once in period one and retains
all remaining workers in period two (point B1). Given marginal productivity
18In other words, job insecurity makes the bad firm over-adjust its labor force. Meyer,
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) find that firms can over-adjust their labor force when a bad
shock occurs due to agents engaging in influence activities.
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  (wm +1+α)(1-δ(1/φ-1)) 
MC1 
n1 n2
oB
 n2
oG
 
G1 
 wm+1+α+δγEαa 
 wm +1+α 
Ñ2B Ñ2G 
G2 
B1 
B2 
f*1(n1,θ1) 
f**1(n1,θ1) 
Figure 1: First Period Employment Choice
f∗∗1 , the good firm chooses a level such that in period two it will retain
everyone and not hire new workers (point G2) and the bad firm chooses a
gradualism solution where it lays off workers in stages (point B2).
It is important to point out that in either a big-bang or gradualism, the
number of workers retained by a bad type at the end of period two is the
same (n¯oB2 ). If job insecurity didn’t affect the survivors’ effort levels, a bad
type would keep n∗1 number of workers in period one and lay off n
∗
1 − n¯
oB
2 of
them in period two. However, job insecurity reduces survivors’ commitment
to their job, forcing the firm to pay higher wages to induce high effort. There-
fore, when choosing n∗B1 , a bad type faces a trade-off between increasing the
number of workers retained in period one and reducing their job insecurity.
This trade-off can make it optimal to completely remove job insecurity of the
survivors by choosing a big-bang strategy (n∗B1 = n¯
oB
2 ).
19
We can now analyze what determines whether a firm engages in a big-bang
19This trade-off disappears when retention levels are chosen by a social planner. Big-
bang is never socially optimal because the social planner internalizes workers’ utilities and
any wage increase due to job insecurity has no impact on her objective function. A more
thorough welfare analysis is available in Jeon and Shapiro (2006).
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or gradual downsizing strategy. In general, given a level of job insecurity, the
larger the expected returns to job search, the higher a premium the workers
command, making the big-bang more likely. The expected returns to job
search depend on employment opportunities, job search effectiveness, and
labor market tightness. In addition, lower marginal productivity for the firm
can make it more likely to make sweeping cuts. This may be due to its
fundamental production process, or the shocks which hit the firm. A larger
negative shock in period one reduces the marginal productivity of all workers,
making a high wage more costly and big-bang more likely. A smaller negative
shock in period two increases n¯oB2 and implies that the number of people to
be downsized is smaller in both periods. With more workers retained, the
marginal productivity of the last worker in period one is lower, making it
too costly to pay a high wage and big-bang more likely. We summarize these
determinants in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Big-bang is more likely if
1. Workers’ outside job prospects are better, i.e. if
(i) On-the-job search is effective (γE high)
(ii) The labor market is very tight (a high)
(iii) The value of finding employment in the following period is large
(V E,out2 − V
U
2 high)
2. The firm’s marginal productivity is low
(i) In absolute terms: due to technology or product market competition
(ii) Relative to wages: when the first period shock is worse or the second
period shock is not as bad
It is natural to wonder about how gradualism takes place - does the
majority of downsizing take place in period one or period two? That answer
is also given to us by the corollary. Conditional on being in a regime of
gradualism, the factors which made the big-bang more likely also make the
amount of downsizing larger in period one relative to period two.
Although an empirical analysis is outside the scope of this paper, it is
worth examining which directions the corollary points us towards. Waves
of layoffs create job insecurity for survivors, increasing the firm’s marginal
cost of retaining a worker in period one. Greenhalgh, Lawrence, and Sutton
(1988) find similar results when reviewing the management literature: “The
negative effects of waves of layoffs have been reported in case studies of the
Atari Corporation (Sutton, Eisenhardt, and Jucker (1986)), Amax (Reibstein
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(1985)), and American Telephone and Telegraph (Guyon (1986)), and they
have been noted in the decline of the hospital industry (White (1985)). To
avoid this stress, managers make cuts that exceed the expected oversupply”.20
Wages may be different between firms in period 1 if the bad firm has a
policy of gradualism. The bad firm must pay higher wages to compensate for
job insecurity.21 In some sense, this is a compensating differential, although
the worker is not directly choosing between jobs at a good and a bad firm.
Examples of a wage premium for job insecurity are plentiful:
• At United Airlines, most of the “75,000 employees... had bought a
majority stake in the airline, taking huge pay cuts in return for a com-
mitment that none of United’s employee-owners would be laid off for
five years”. Moreover, “the list of pilots seeking jobs at United has
swelled to more than 10,000, even though the airline now pays less
than some of its biggest rivals”.22
• Moretti (2000) examines the compensating differential in the agricul-
tural sector for temporary work over permanent work and find that it
is between 9.36 and 11.9 percent of the average worker’s hourly wage.23
• Dial and Murphy (1995), in their study of General Dynamics, observe
that the wage premium for working in “the competitive defense in-
dustry” reflected specialized skills and a “compensating differential for
risky employment in an industry with historically variable demand”.24
The productivity results in the corollary suggest that industries may dif-
fer substantially in their layoff policies. High productivity or profitability
industries should be more stable. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) state that
for manufacturing “the relative volatility of destruction [to job creation] falls
with trend growth and rises with firm size, plant age and the inventory-
sales ratio” while Farber (1997) notes that professional services have low
20Greenhalgh, Lawrence, and Sutton (1988), p.246.
21In a case study involving 4 different downsizing/ restructuring events at a financial
services firm, Oyer (2002) finds mixed evidence about how wages change leading up to a
layoff.
22Sanger and Lohr (1996), p.195 and p.202.
23He also provides a literature review of compensating differentials related to unemploy-
ment risk. The results are mixed, but most previous estimations suffered from sample
selection problems and unobserved individual heterogeneity.
24Dial and Murphy (1995), p.303.
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and consistent rates of job loss. On the negative side, Bewley (1999, section
13.3) provides evidence that managers don’t consider labor market conditions
when making layoff decisions, although they are aware of on-the-job search
for other jobs.
4 Asymmetric information
A key result of the complete information solution is that massive one-time
layoffs can reduce job insecurity. Nevertheless, there are cases when firms will
not conduct layoffs in response to large negative shocks.25 Our explanation
for such zero layoff policies lies in signaling; a good firm may use retentions
(and possibly wages) to reassure workers that the future is promising, and
thereby reduce job insecurity costs. “People appreciate hearing [about a no-
layoff policy]” says a vice president in a large public relations firm, “Everyone
knew what was going on in the economy and knew that our business had been
affected.”26
We now assume that the firm has private information about the period
two shock. Workers at the firm have an ex-ante belief that with probability
ν, θ2 = θ
G
2 and with probability 1 − ν, θ2 = θ
B
2 . The private information
may reflect a firm’s superior knowledge of how well prepared it is for demand
shocks or of overall market conditions and trends.
The good firm has no incentives to masquerade as the bad firm since it
could easily have done so in complete information, but found it optimal not to
do so. The bad type, on the other hand, was restricted in its choices because
it had to offer higher wages to compensate workers for a higher probability
of being laid off in the second period.27 The minimum wage that the bad
firm could offer was wB(n1) = wm + 1 + α+ δmax{(1−
n¯oB
2
n
1
), 0}γEαa.
25In the wake of September 11th, many businesses explicitly reassured workers that
no layoffs would occur. Those include firms outside of the airplane and financial sectors
discussed in the introduction - in such diverse sectors as steel, law, and public relations (see
“Some companies choose no-layoff policy”, by Stephanie Armour, USA Today, December
17, 2001).
26 from “Some companies choose no-layoff policy”, by Stephanie Armour, USA Today,
December 17, 2001
27A necessary condition for the existence of an adverse selection problem is f(n∗G
1
, θ1)−
(wm + 1 + α)n
∗G
1
> f(n∗B
1
, θ1) − w
B(n∗B
1
)n∗B
1
. For this section, we assume that this
condition holds.
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We study the fully separating equilibrium28. The equilibrium concept
employed is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and we refine the set of equilibria
using the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. The model presents a two-
dimensional signaling problem: the firm may use both the period 1 employ-
ment level and wages of original workers to signal. This problem is similar
to that of Milgrom and Roberts (1986).29
In the separating equilibrium, the good firm chooses in period 1 an em-
ployment level nS and a wage wS for workers such that the bad firm does not
have any incentives to masquerade as the good firm. Specifically, we define
the belief structure of workers, µ(n1, w1), as the probability that the firm is
good given its first period employment and wage decisions. This then implies
that in the separating equilibrium µ(nS, wS) = 1. Moreover, if the separat-
ing equilibrium exists, the bad firm is recognized as bad. It will then choose
its employment and wage optimally, opting for the solution to the complete
information case (n∗B
1
, wB(n∗B
1
)), meaning that µ(n∗B
1
, wB(n∗B
1
)) = 0.
Two incentive constraints define the set of separating equilibria (nS, wS).
First, the bad firm must prefer being recognized and choosing (n∗B
1
, wB(n∗B
1
))
to masquerading by selecting (nS, wS). Second, the good firm must prefer
separating with (nS, wS) to being perceived as the bad firm. When the good
firm is perceived to be the bad firm, the wage level necessary to prevent quits
is the same as the one the bad firm must use: wB(n1). Since beliefs are not
pinned down off the equilibrium path, we assume that the beliefs of workers
are such that any feasible choice of the bad firm (i.e. an n1 and w1 ≥ w
B(n1))
is believed to have come from the bad firm30, or µ(n1, w1) = 0. We denote
(nGB, w
B(nGB)) as the optimal choice of the good type when workers believe
that it is the bad type.
We will establish the result using a graphical argument, depicted in Figure
2. For now, we assume that the optimal complete information choice for the
bad firm was that of gradualism, where the solution was n∗B
1
and wB(n∗B
1
)
(point B). The results for a big-bang solution are qualitatively the same.
We begin the analysis by defining isoprofit curves in (n1, w1) space. The
28We ignore semi-separating equilibria, where a firm may have mixed strategies. Pooling
equilibria may exist, and are fully analyzed in Jeon and Shapiro (2006). We comment on
the qualitative aspects of pooling equilibria at the end of this section.
29Milgrom and Roberts also have two dimensions of signaling, prices and advertising.
Another paper along these lines is Bagwell and Ramey (1988).
30Cho-Kreps is not of any use here, since both firms’ equilibrium choices will dominate
the payoffs of choices where w > wB(n1).
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curve ISOB represents all of the employment-wage pairs for the bad firm
which yield the same profits as its complete information choice. The curve
ISOG depicts the employment-wage pairs for the good firm which yield the
same profits as its choice when it is believed to be the bad firm, (nGB, w
B(nGB)),
denoted by point C. By definition, these curves are the minimum level of
profits that the firms can achieve in a separating equilibrium (nS, wS). The
curves are both tangent to the wB(n1) curve at points (n
∗B
1
, wB(n∗B
1
)) and
(nGB, w
B(nGB)). From the isoprofit curve of the bad firm, we see that, 1)
Gradualism is preferred to big-bang (point B is preferred to point A) and 2)
the bad firm prefers the good firm’s complete information choice to its own
(point D is preferred to point B).
The isoprofit curves intersect only once since they satisfy a weak single
crossing property: (dw1
dn
1
|θ
2
=θG −
dw
1
dn
1
|θ
2
=θB) ≥ 0. This implies that the slope
of the isoprofit curve for the good firm is always greater than or equal to the
slope of the curve for the bad firm. This is straightforward to show, and fol-
lows from the fact that keeping an extra worker in the first period is (weakly)
more profitable for the good firm. The inequality is strict everywhere except
when n1 < N˜
B
2
and n1 ≥ n¯
oG
2
.31
The area below the isoprofit curve for the good firm and above the iso-
profit curve for the bad firm satisfies both incentive constraints. All choices in
this area are thus equilibrium dominated for the bad firm, hence Cho-Kreps
assigns µ(n1, w1) = 1 to these choices. The signaling problem then amounts
to the good firm maximizing its profits subject to the condition that the bad
firm must receive as much profits as in complete information.32
The solution (nS, wS) is characterized by:
Proposition 2 With asymmetric information and assumption 1, a separat-
ing equilibrium will take one of two possible forms:
1. The good firm chooses nS ∈ (n
∗G
1
, n¯oG
2
] and wS = wm+1+α in period
1 and retains all workers (possibly hiring new ones) and pays the same wage
in period 2.
31The former inequality will never be relevant, since profits for the bad firm in this
region are smaller than those in complete information. In the case of the latter inequality,
both types of firms lay off workers in period two and their second period profits do not
change with n1, implying that the slope of their isoprofit lines is the same.
32We did not discuss beliefs for the area below the curve wB(n1) and above the upper
envelope of the two isoprofit curves because for any beliefs these choices would yield lower
profits for the firms.
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Figure 2: The Separating Equilibrium
2.The good firm chooses nS > n¯
oG
2
and wS > wm + 1 + α in period 1 and
chooses n¯oG
2
and wm + 1 + α in period 2.
In both solutions, the bad firm chooses its complete information levels as
characterized in Proposition 1.
The first result of the proposition is depicted in figure 2. Here, the asym-
metric information problem is ‘small’ in the sense that point D (the good
type’s complete information solution) would increase the bad firm’s profits
only a small amount. In this case, the good firm uses only increased em-
ployment levels to signal, holding the wage fixed at wm + 1 + α. Since the
good firm’s isoprofit curve always has greater slope than the bad firm’s, the
tangency can only occur at the kinked part (point S1). In the second re-
sult of the proposition, the asymmetric information problem is ‘large’; the
bad firm has large incentives to masquerade as the good one. In this case,
there are a range of tangencies, since both firms’ isoprofit lines have the same
slope in the area where n1 ≥ n¯
oG
2
. All of these solutions involve the good
firm increasing its level of employment above n∗G
1
and its wage strictly above
wm + 1 + α.
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Under asymmetric information, a good type can reduce the job insecurity
of survivors only by retaining more workers than necessary in period one.33
The reduction in downsizing may be so large as to imply zero layoffs in period
one for the good firm despite the optimality of positive layoffs in complete
information. The effectiveness of signaling comes from the fact that it is
less costly for the good firm to reduce its downsizing in period 1 in the
interval n¯oB
2
< n1 < n¯
oG
2
. A wage increase will be a part of the signal when
employment increases so much that the good firm creates some job insecurity.
5 Conclusion
Managing job insecurity ranks as one of the central human resource tasks of a
firm when faced with a shaky economic climate. The balance between laying
off redundant workers and maintaining some level of job security forms the
basis for a broad set of layoff patterns. These patterns, which differ in their
amount of layoffs and timing, can have substantial effects on the welfare of
workers and the economy in general.
This paper has offered as simple a model as possible to characterize the
layoff practices of firms. We found that downsizing patterns (one time mas-
sive cuts versus waves of downsizing) can be distinguished and we isolated
the contributions of firm productivity and labor market conditions to the
firm’s decision. Moreover, we were able to explain zero-layoff policies as
firms signaling that their future prospects are bright.
Our paper represents a call for further empirical research into the specific
causes of downsizing. As Butcher and Hallock (2004) state, “there is little
academic work in economics that investigates how, when, and why firms
make layoff decisions”. Underlying trends have become much clearer in the
past 10 years thanks to Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999), Farber (2003), and Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff (2003),
while managerial intentions have been captured in Hallock (2003) and Bewley
(1999). Although difficult because of data concerns, our analysis suggests
that firm level analysis across sectors could yield rich insights.
33When pooling equilibria exist, both firms raise their employment levels above their
complete information levels and pay a wage above wm + 1 + α in the first period. Both
firms then downsize in the second period.
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6 Appendix
We offer a proof of Proposition 1 in two parts. First we consider the good
firm:
Lemma 1 Under assumption 1, a type G firm
1. Never fires workers in period two (n∗G
1
≤ n¯oG
2
);
2. Retains in period one strictly more original workers than the static
optimal level: n∗G
1
> n∗
1
;
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3. Hires new workers in period two if and only if N̂G
1
< N˜G
2
, where N̂G
1
is defined by
f1(N̂
G
1
, θ1) ≡ (wm + 1 + α) (1− δ
1− φ
φ
).
Proof. 1. Suppose that a good firm lays off some original workers at
period two, in which case nG
1
> n¯oG
2
. This implies from assumption 1 that
f1(n
G
1
, θ1) < f1(n¯
oG
2
, θ1) < f1(n¯
oG
2
, θG
2
). On the other hand, from the first
order condition with respect to nG
1
, we have f1(n
G
1
, θ1) = (wm+1+α)+δγEαa
and, from the definition of n¯oG
2
, we have f1(n¯
oG
2
, θG
2
) = wm + 1 + α. Hence,
we have f1(n
G
1
, θ1) > f1(n¯
oG
2
, θG
2
), which is a contradiction.
2. From part 1, we know n∗G
1
≤ n¯oG
2
. Consider first the case n∗G
1
< n¯oG
2
and suppose n∗G
1
≤ n∗
1
. On the one hand, n∗G
1
≤ n∗
1
implies f1(n
∗G
1
, θ1) ≥
f1(n
∗
1
, θ1). On the other hand, from the first order condition with respect
to n∗G
1
, we know f1(n
∗G
1
, θ1) < wm + 1 + α = f1(n
∗
1
, θ1) for n
∗G
1
< n¯oG
2
.
Hence, there is a contradiction. Consider now the case n∗G
1
= n¯oG
2
. Since
f1(n
∗
1
, θ1) = wm + 1 + α = f1(n¯
oG
2
, θG
2
) holds, from assumption 1 we must
have n∗
1
< n¯oG
2
.
3. If N̂G
1
< N˜G
2
holds, it is optimal for the firm to keep N̂G
1
number of
original workers in period one. Hence, in period two, it is optimal to hire
(N˜G
2
− N̂G
1
)/φ of new workers in period two. If N̂G
1
≥ N˜G
2
holds, it is optimal
for the firm to have n∗G
1
≥ N˜G
2
. Hence, there is no hiring in period two.
Second, we consider the bad firm.
Lemma 2 Under assumption 1, a type B firm
1. Never chooses n∗B
1
< n¯oB
2
, which implies that it never hires in period
two;
2. Retains strictly less original workers than the static optimal level in
period one: n∗B
1
< n∗
1
;
Proof. 1. Suppose that a type B firm chose n∗B
1
< n¯oB
2
. This implies
that f1(n
∗B
1
, θ1) < wm + 1 + α = f1(n¯
oB
2
, θB
2
). However, by assumption 1,
f1(n¯
oB
2
, θB
2
) < f1(n¯
oB
2
, θ1) and by concavity, n
∗B
1
< n¯oB
2
also implies that
f1(n¯
oB
2
, θ1) < f1(n
∗B
1
, θ1), which gives us a clear contradiction.
2. From part 1, we know n∗B
1
≥ n¯oB
2
. Consider first the case n∗B
1
> n¯oB
2
and suppose n∗B
1
≥ n∗
1
. One the one hand, n∗B
1
≥ n∗
1
implies f1(n
∗B
1
, θ1) ≤
f1(n
∗
1
, θ1). On the other hand, from the first order condition with respect to
n∗B
1
, we know f1(n
∗B
1
, θ1) = (wm + 1 + α) + δγEαa for n
∗B
1
> n¯oB
2
, which is
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strictly larger than f1(n
∗
1
, θ1) = wm + 1+ α. Hence, there is a contradiction.
Consider now the case n∗B
1
= n¯oB
2
. Since f1(n
∗
1
, θ1) = wm+1+α = f1(n¯
oB
2
, θB
2
)
holds, from assumption 1, we must have n∗
1
> n¯oG
2
.
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